Abstract
Introduction
Hydropower is considered as the only feasible reliable and sustainable source of energy in Nepal. In various periodic plans over past decades, Government of Nepal has placed a central focus in hydro energy development, since energy is the catalyst of economic development and essence of modern life of people. Hydro power projects by virtue are capital intensive; require advanced technology and huge finance, hence, it is imperative to develop it through the initiation of private, public and government participation. Besides, the foreign investment has also been felt necessary to fill up the gap in energy demand and supply situation. Particularly, the Electricity Act 1992 and Hydro Power Development Policy 2001 focused necessity of private and foreign investment in the country's power project development. Despite all possible measures taken for attracting private and foreign investment in hydro sector, only 2 % of total feasible hydro energy capacity of the country has been utilized till the end of 2017. Although, Nepal has technical capacity of The electricity demand in Nepal is growing by 100 to130 MW annually (Ministry of Finance, Nepal, 2074) . Currently, electricity demandis 1444 MW at peak time but country has supply position of hardly 961 MW including the 400 MW power imported from India in dry season, making short supply of electricity to 483MW per day. Meanwhile, the country is in rush of power generation by permitting construction licenses to mega hydro electric projects including Upper Tamakoshi (456 MW), Chamellia (30 MW), Budhi Gandaki (1200 MW), Upper Karnali (900 MW) and Arun Third (900 MW) among others. The power plant installation cost in Nepal is estimated to be 1.5 to 2 million dollar per Mega Watt depending upon the nature of project and type of geographic sites. The country targets to produce 2000 MW electricity per year to turn out the electricity generation goal of 10000 MW in coming five years as per power development plan of Government of Nepal. For accomplishment of such over ambitious target, the country needs to invest at least 4 billion dollar per year (i.e. 15 % of GDP) in power development projects which is almost impossible to finance from internal capital markets. The country needs to appeal and facilitate global power investors in Nepal to overcome such huge financing gaps in power industry. Source -Shrestha, H.M. (1966) In the early years of hydro power development of Nepal, financing of power projects came through grants aid by neighboring countries. For example, India's grants were utilized to construct Trishuli (18 MW), Devighat (14.1 MW), Gandak (15 MW) and Surajpura-Kosi (20MW), Chinese assistance for Sunkoshi (10MW) and former USSR for Panauti (2.4 MW). Since 1970, bilateral and multilateral funds were available for hydropower development. The major donor countries in the period were Japan, Norway, Germany and South Korea including Canada, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and USA. The lending agencies were the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan Bank for Industrial Corporation (JBIC) former Overseas Economic Co-operative Fund (OECF), Saudi Fund for Development, Kuwait Fund and others. Following the adoption of policy of economic liberalization since 1990 AD, hydropower development took a new turn with the private sector entering the arena (MOWR, 2004) .
After promulgation of Hydro Electric Act (1992), private investment called independent power producers (IPP) entered into the sectors along with key contributory Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) which has constructed major hydro power stations including Kaligandaki-A (144MW), Marshyangdi (69MW), Kulekhani-1&2 (92MW), Trishuli (24MW), Gandak (15MW), Modi Khola (14.8MW) among others. Publicly held Hydro power companies like Butwal Power Company BPC), Chilime Hydro Power Company (CHPC), Himal Power Limited (HPL) Arun Valley Hydro Power Company Limited (AVHPL), Bhotekoshi Power Company (BKPC) National Hydropower Company Limited ( NHCL), Sanima Hydro Power Limited (SHPL) etc emerged as independent power producers in Nepal and developed power projects like Khimti-I (60MW), Bhotekoshi (36MW), Chilime(20MW) Jhimruk (12MW) Indrawati (7.5MW), Aandhikhola (9.4MW), Piluwa Khola (3MW), Sunkoshi Small (2.5MW) among others. With the entrance of national and foreign private investors in hydro power sector of Nepal, it has considerably changed the dynamics of hydro industry along with Nepalese capital market in which trading of stocks of hydro power companies constitute a major share of total market capitalization.
Even though, Nepalese capital market has considerably extended enough with abundant of investible funds after liberalization initiatives, the frictions in capital market like information asymmetry, faulty incentive design, and moral hazards issues still hinder the sufficient flow of capitals to the power development projects. As is evident from the observation of recent Further Public Offering (FPO) by the nation's largest independent power producer (IPP), Butwal Power Company (BPC), a foreign conglomerate faced the disappointing responses by public as compared to other sectors like micro finance, insurance and BFIs. Most of the power projects in Nepal have long gestation period facing the problems in clearance of Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA), conflict in reimbursement of land with local communities of project affected areas including unjustified demands with provocation from political fronts, unreasonable pressure on construction of infrastructures to local community of project site, unanticipated landslides risks posing significant cost, schedule and environmental challenges, along with sediment loads, both a design challenge and environmental challenge for hydropower development throughout the southern slopes of the Himalayas. All of these risks add construction, maintenance and operation cost of these projects making the private investors reluctant to invest in such risky and long gestation ventures. Hence, in a fierce of energy crisis, the Government of Nepal in its incessant attempt to motivating national and foreign private investors in electricity sector has promulgated Electric Act (1992) and Water Resource Act (1992) with the provisions of income tax rebate, premiums price in Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for dry seasons, NEA's investment and subsidy in transmission line construction among others. Despite the measures taken to boost up the foreign and private entrepreneurs, financing and investment gaps in power sector persist substantially in Nepal.
Theoretically the private investment decisions in hydro power industry could be explained by the expected future profitability or investment opportunities of power generating companies. Amid huge investment opportunities in hydropower sector of Nepal, companies and private investors show delayed response to this fact which places ground to policy makers and researchers for investigating financing frictions associated with capital markets i.e. supply side constraints of investment. In frictionless capital market, the investment should not be constrained by the financing resources as hypothesized by Modigliani & Miller (1958) in their seminal works of capital structure theory. Additionally firm's financing policies should not affect the investment decisions, as the internal and external capitals are perfect substitute to each other in which external investors are fully informed about the aspects of production, technology, process, risks and expected future profitability of the new projects. Alternatively a major theoretical departure in investment literatures stems from the work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) that stress on low explanatory power of Tobin's Q (proxy for future profitability) in investment equation. They empirically test the role of cashflows and find it prominent to explain investment behavior of firms particularly those operating in informational asymmetric capital markets when uncertainty about growth prospects hinder the external providers of funds to invest in firm's projects and internal funds become insufficient to match the investment demand. In external front, banks and financial institutions are in short of long term capital to wait until the cashflows of the long gestation period projects like hydropower that increase the risk of matching maturity time of short term deposits made by the general public. Additionally banks and financing institutions face credit rationing, quotas and restrictions imposed by central bank to invest enough in huge capital demanding projects like hydro power generation. Confronting these capital constraints issues, hydro companies face uncertainty in growth prospects, and this uncertainty may be resolved through time as cashflow realizations provide new information. Under such conjectural underpinning, firms with elevated growth uncertainty apparently depend upon their cashflows that contain new information for further investment resulting the firm's investment program spirally sensitive to their internal cashflows. While theoretical argument is well known in investment literatures, its empirical impact on investment cashflow relation has not been analyzed particularly in the context of Nepalese capital market with reference to hydro power sector. Can the link between cashflows and the investment policy of hydro power companies account for observed relationship of financing factors? Do Nepalese power companies face financing constraints in investment of new projects? If so, what is the level of investment cashflows sensitivity of these companies? And after controlling the investment opportunities and leverage effect, do the companies still show the cashflow sensitivity to their investment? This study attempts to answer these questions by analyzing investment cashflows sensitivities of the hydro power companies listed in Nepalese capital market. An equation of firm investment and financing is solved based upon the standard neoclassical investment model with augmented cashflow variable as per the specification proposed by FHP (1988).
Data and Sample
This study adopted the descriptive and analytical research strategy. The main objective of this study is to examine the investment behavior of Nepalese hydro companies and estimate their cashflow coefficients in alternative model specification. For econometric analysis of the relationship among cashflows, investment, and profitability variables, the data should be obtained from the financial reports of the companies. Company annual reports that provide the audited financial statements and information are the most reliable and valid information for the given study purpose. Hence, financial statements are taken out from the sample companies listed in Nepal Stock Exchange limited.
Four sample companies were chosen out of all independent power producers (IPP) engaged in hydro power development in Nepal. These sample companies constituted the majority of total listed hydropower companies in Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE) limited. Four out of six listed companies were taken as sample that constitutes 66.67% of population. However, there were seventy hydro projects by Independent Power Producers (IPPs) generating 483 MW of hydro electricity by 2017AD. (see annex-A) Considering the availability of required data and annual reports of company, the sample chosen for study purpose are; Butwal Power Company (BPC), Chilime Hydro Power Limited (CHPL), Arun Valley Hydro Power Limited (AVHPL) and National Hydro Power Limited (NHPL).
The companies chosen for study and other relevant information about the sample firms has been presented in Table ( 2). The table depicts that the sample companies have pipelines of huge investment in hydro projects. At least each of the companies is noticed investing in construction and operation of hydro projects either directly or indirectly through joint venture initiation. 
Methods of Analysis
Standard neoclassical model of investment as developed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) served as the basic model for this study. The regression specification for examining the investment cashflows sensitivities in asymmetric information framework is obtained using the equation (1) as follows;
Where I it represents net investment in fixed assets for firm i during period t; and it is the dependent variable in given regression equation. It is obtained as the first difference of tangible fixed assets plus depreciation in present study. X represents a vector of variables, possibly including lagged values, that have been emphasized as determinants of investment from a variety of theoretical perspectives; € i is an error term. Investment opportunity (X) in equation (1) is an important explanatory variable. Theoretically marginal Q could be used for the approximation of present and expected future investment opportunities. Since marginal Q is unobservable, many investment studies for industrialized countries use average Q as a proxy. However in order to be able to calculate average Q, the country concerned should have a well-developed stock market.
In Nepal this is still not the case, and only a limited number of hydropower companies are listed and do not have their stock trading regularly. In this study, therefore difference in sales scaled by net fixed assets is used as a proxy for the investment opportunities of the sample firm. This proxy is also used in other studies in transition economies (see e.g.; Lensink and Sterken, 1998, Budina et al, 2004,) and more often it outperforms Tobin's Q (Fazzari et al.1988) . Similarly (Abel, 1986) , (Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995) have proposed Marginal Profitability of Capital (MPK) as a proxy for investment opportunity. Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1995) suggest using Sales to Capital(S/K) ratio for approximation of expected marginal profitability of capital (MPK). By applying envelope theorem, they develop MPK as below;
Where θ=(1+n -1 )α k, n=(∂y/∂p)p/y<−1 is the firm level price elasticity of demand,α k is the capital share of output from the Cobb-Douglas specification, and S=ρ/γ is the firm's sales. Equation (2) shows that, up to a scale parameter, the ratio of sales to capital measures the marginal profitability of fixed capital (MPK).
The liquidity coefficient 'β 2 ' depends on the firm's internal cashflow to capital ratio (CF/K); it represents the potential sensitivity of investment to fluctuations in available internal finance-after investment opportunities are controlled. The liquidity variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with investment opportunities. A positive and significant coefficient of the liquidity variable is thought to indicate that cashflow constraints matter to the extent that investment is sensitive to fluctuations in internal finance but in case of perfect capital market the cashflow coefficient would be insignificantly different from zero. All variables are divided by the beginning of period capital stock 'K'. Operating cash flow is used as a proxy for the liquidity variable in equation (1).
The baseline regression equation to be estimated in this study has therefore been specified as under;
Where, the dependent variable I/K have been specified as the investment in fixed assets scaled by its capital stock at the beginning of the period. The independent variables for the study are specified as; a) S/K = Sales scaled by net fixed assets at beginning of the period. (Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995) (Abel, 1986) in empirical investment studies of imperfect market has long traditions for example; (Cleary, 1999 ) (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1988) etc.
For analysis of data and estimation of various regression specifications including Fixed Effect, random
Effect and Dynamic Investment Model Gretl statistical software was used. Gretl statistical package is more efficient and easier to test the normality of data and prescribe the endogenity problems in model specification in regression analysis.
Analysis and Study Results
The study of firm specific endogenous shocks to firm's investment decisions is central to corporate finance literatures. Sales, profitability, cashflows, equity and leverage are the major explanatory variables for investment decisions of companies operating in imperfect market. Many investment literatures including (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1996 ; Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995; Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991) etc emphasized the volatility of sales and cashflow variables and examined the impact of such uncertainty on investment demand of the firms. Business cycles and its countercyclical shocks to the firm's networth are also the well documented facts in firm's growth and investment program. (Abel, 1986) . But little empirical knowledge is obtained about the relationship of investment and cyclical variations of cashflows, sales, profitability etc of the hydropower companies. Figure 1 presents the time specific variations of study variables for sample companies. The X-axis denotes the time period in year and Y-axis is for variable specific fluctuations expressed in million of Rupees. It is interesting enough to observe the relationship between investment and leverage of sample companies which co-proceed with similar path in up and down movements but investment frontier is too sharp while leverage curve too fat and takes sluggish turn around in its movement. As noticed in figure 1 , the investment path of sample companies took over four major leaps during the interval of study period. But cashflows variables show constant upward movement till the middle of study period which then dumps down for a while and gets again recovery to peak at the subsequent periods. Sales, net fixed assets, operating profit and retained earnings of the sample firms show the similar pattern. One clear implication from the table could be observed that the volatility of study variables extrapolate the trajectory of investment and growth of hydro power industry of Nepal.
The firm specific investment to capital ratio is presented in figure 2 which depicts that companies have investment ratio ranging up to 70 % of its capital stock. It also depicts the hydro companies having investment ratio higher during the decade after 2010 AD. Sample companies have substantial investment growth after 2010 AD except the case of National Hydro Power Company. in term of Assets and sales volume. The average return on assets for the companies is 13.7 and 13.1 percent both in mean and median values. Similarly the net profit margin for sample companies is more than 50 percent both in mean and median statistics that is encouraging for further investment. Cashflows to capital ratio is the measure for internal financing capacity of the companies. It is considered the main stimuli for investment in imperfect capital market. Due to low cost and freedom of management to utilize it flexibly, most of the companies encourage deploying their internal funds to finance their investment. The mean cashflow to capital ratio is 21.8 percent as compared to its median value 17 percent only. Additionally the average investment to capital ratio for sample companies is 12.4 percent and median value is 5.6 percent only. It shows that the Nepalese hydro companies utilize about 50 percent of their internal cashflows to finance their fixed investment.
Regression results
The diagnostic test for choosing appropriate model estimation i.e. random effect Vs fixed effect model has been considered as the most important process before the regression analysis. The Gretl software allows the diagnostic test of model with following procedures for Hausman Test.
The Hausman test probes the consistency of the GLS estimates. The null hypothesis is that these estimates are consistent-that is, that the requirement of orthogonality of the vi and the Xi is satisfied. The test is based on a measure, H, of the "distance" between the fixed-effects and random effects estimates, constructed such that under the null it follows the X 2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of timevarying regressors in the matrix X. If the value of H is "large" this suggests that the random effects estimator is not consistent and the fixed-effects model is preferable. The procedure for calculating H is given by;
− Treat the random-effects model as the restricted model, and record its sum of squared residuals as SSRr . − Estimate via OLS an unrestricted model in which the dependent variable is quasidemeaned y and the regressors include both quasi-demeaned X (as in the RE model) and the de-meaned variants of all the time-varying variables (i.e. the fixed-effects regressors); record the sum of squared residuals from this model as SSRu. − Compute H =n(SSRr -SSRu.) /SSRu, where n is the total number of observations used.
On this variant H cannot be negative, since adding additional regressors to the RE model cannot raise the SSR. − By default Gretl computes the Hausman test via the regression method (Correl & Luchheti, 2017) The result of model diagnostic test has been presented in The null hypothesis is that the Random Effect Model is consistent, in favor of the Fixed Effect Model. But the P-Statistics in this test shows the value higher than 0.05 with chi-square (2) value 1.6676 suggest rejecting the null hypothesis. Consequently Fixed Effect Model has been considered as consistent and adequate predictor for the hypothesized relationship of cashflows-investment sensitivity of Nepalese hydro power companies. The regression results for fixed effect model are presented in table 6. With p-value = P (F(3, 37) > 6.45838) = 0.00125689
The first part of the Table ( 6) has presented the coefficient of cashflows, leverage and sales as the hypothesized predictors of the given investment model. The leverage has been added to investment equation to measure the stability of cashflow coefficient in the given specification. It confirms the robustness of liquidity variable in explaining investment behavior of firms. As per the priori expectation, cashflows and leverage have significant impact on investment decisions of hydro companies. The cashflow coefficient is positively larger and significant at 1 % level. It indicates that the investment decision of hydro companies has been constrained by the capital market frictions. The larger and positive cashflow coefficient indicates the severity of information or moral hazards problem in capital market.
Test for differing group intercepts has been performed for fixed effect model. The null hypothesis was that the groups have a common intercept. The result of the test statistic is F (3, 37) = 6.4583 with p-value = P(F(3, 37) >6.4583 ) = 0.001256. The significance p-value of F(3, 37) test statistic indicates that the groups have a differing group intercepts. Meaning that fixed effect model is suggested for the data set. With p-value = 0 Table 7 presents the results from equation (3) that includes the lagged investment variable to examine its effect on firm investment decisions besides the leverage. When lagged investment variable included in the set of expounding variables, the explanatory power of regression model improved more. The results from the fixed effect model indicate that the value of R 2 and adjusted R 2 are 0.3663 and 0.3545 respectively. The overall explanatory power of the regression model looks good with R 2 of 0.3663. The result implies that about 36.63% change in investment rate is explained by the variations in explanatory variables, denoting that the regression has good fit and is reliable. In the model, F statistics is 4.3946 and its p-value (F Sig.) is 0.006, which signify that the model is fairly fitted well statistically. Because, the F-statistic, a measure of the overall significance of the regression, shows that the explanatory variables employed are significant at the 1% level, which is supported by low standard error of regression equation signifying minimized sum of squared error.
The distribution free Wald test for heteroskedasticity has been performed fixed effect model. The null hypothesis was that the units have common error variances. Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square (4) = 5751.84, with p-value =0.000 indicates that there is no heteroskedasticity because null hypothesis is accepted. Likely, Durbin-Watson statistic =2.1557 with p-value = 0.002827 indicates that there is no autocorrelation problem in the data set. Test for normality of residuals has been performed for fixed effect model. The null hypothesis was that the errors are normally distributed. The result of the test statistic is Chi-square (2) = 21.9894 with p-value = 0.0000. The significance p-value of test statistic indicates that the errors are normally distributed. Meaning that fixed effect model is good fit for the data set.
The empirical finding of the fixed effect model suggests that there is positive and statistically significant relationship between fixed investment spending and internal cashflows of hydro power companies of Nepal. The cashflow variable is found statistically significant with same direction of relationship with investment variable using fixed effects model. The result is as expected and consistent with (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991; Hu & Schiantarelli, 1998) where they have found that investment decisions of financially constrained firms are more sensitive to their internal cashflows since their inability or reluctances to go external capital markets to obtain as much funds as they need for investment. Moreover, the result is justified as on the reason that leverage coefficient are positive but smaller significantly smaller than the cashflow coefficient in explaining investment decisions of Nepalese firms.
Sales to Capital ratio (Sales/K) are found significantly negatively associated with investment decision using fixed effect model. The result is significant at 1% level of significance. The result indicates that hydropower companies do increase investment even in decrease of their sales in Nepalese context. This result is contrary to priori expectation and is also inconsistent to (Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991; Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1988) where they found positive association between investment and sales as the proxy for future expected profitability. The possible reason of such contrary result could be justified on ground that Nepalese hydropower companies do make contract with NEA to sell their electricity at an agreed price with PPA prior to project installation phase and volume of electricity sales determined accordingly. Leverage is found positively associated with investment decisions of Nepalese hydro companies. The leverage coefficient is significant at 5% level of significance. It indicates that Nepalese hydro companies' investment decisions are positively associated with leverage decisions. It indicates that the companies with access to bank or financial institutions should have higher investment ratio than the companies without leverage access. Moreover, with the inclusion of leverage ratio in investment model, the cashflow variable shows the stable and consistent implication on investment. It supports the prior studies of (Cleary, 1999; Pradhan & Kurmi, 2004; Subedi, 2008) among others.
Conclusion
This study examined the determinants of fixed investment decisions of Nepalese hydro companies listed in the Nepal Stock Exchange. The descriptive and causal comparative research designs have been adopted for the study. The pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect model have been used to examine the determinants of investment policy of hydro companies. The panel data of 4 hydro companies over the period of 2000 to 2016 have been collected from the annual reports of the companies in sample. The dependent variable used in the study is investment to capital ratio and independent variables are: sales to capital ratio, cashflows to capital ratio, leverage, and lagged investment.
The estimated regression models reveal that cashflows to capital ratio has positive and statistically significant impact on hydro investment decisions. Leverage is found significantly positively associated with investment decision. However, sales to capital ratio and lagged investment seem negative in explaining the variation of investment. Eventually, this study concludes that the major determinants of hydro companies' investment decisions are internal cashflows, and leverage or loan from the banks and financial institutions in Nepalese context. This study offers the following recommendations based on the findings from the empirical analysis. Firstly, Nepalese hydro companies have nominal levels of investment which can pose a significant impediment to fulfill the demand of hydropower development in Nepal. Moreover, the hydro companies show their interdependency to their internal cashflows for financing their new investment projects. This relationship strongly supports the financing constraints hypothesis that indicates the capital market frictions as the major obstacle of hydro investment in Nepal. Although the companies have access to banks and foreign capital, still the financing gaps persist and they highly depend on their own cashflows for investment. Hence, the government should ensure with appropriate policies, procedures, information systems and regulatory mechanism that enable well functioning of capital markets to efficient flows of funds either in the form of equity or debt to the hydropower investment projects of Nepal.
Finally, the volatility of cashflows and sales of hydro companies along with their long gestation period pose a significant credit risk to banks and lending institutions that hinder them to provide as much credit as they demand. Moreover, the cyclical variations in net worth and collateral values of hydro companies during the tough economic period also resist them to obtain enough finance for further investment. Consequently, it is highly worth mentioning to develop the hedging mechanism in hydro investment for mitigating the default risk associated with variations in cashflows and reductions in collateral values during the downturn of economic activities. When hedging mechanism works, it would permit the extension of debt capacity of hydro companies enabling them to boost up the huge investment for generation of energy as per the power demand of nation.
